Inteligencia de seguridad inalámbrica para agentes de IA.

Traditional wireless security workflow:
  audit WiFi networks              ->  aircrack-ng / Wireshark / Kismet
  test Bluetooth security          ->  Bettercap / btlejack / Ubertooth
  analyze RF signals               ->  HackRF / GNU Radio / GQRX
  check NFC/RFID                   ->  Proxmark3 / libnfc
  assess cellular security         ->  srsRAN / OpenBTS
  test IoT protocols               ->  Zigbee sniffer / Z-Wave tools / MQTT clients
  look up wireless CVEs            ->  NVD / vendor advisories (manual search)
  check compliance                 ->  NIST / PCI-DSS / HIPAA docs (manual)
  map to MITRE ATT&CK              ->  ATT&CK Navigator (manual mapping)
  correlate everything             ->  copy-paste into a report
  ────────────────────────────────
  Total: hours per assessment, most of it context-switching between tools

With wifi-security-mcp-server:
  You: "Audit the wireless security of our office network running WPA2-Enterprise"

  Agent: -> scan_wifi_networks {encryption: "WPA2"}
         -> analyze_wifi_security {encryption: "WPA2-Enterprise", authentication: "EAP-PEAP"}
         -> find_wifi_attacks {target_type: "WPA2-Enterprise"}
         -> detect_wireless_attack {attack_indicators: "deauth frames"}
         -> audit_wireless_compliance {standard: "PCI-DSS", network_type: "WPA2-Enterprise"}
         -> "Your WPA2-Enterprise network has 3 critical findings:
            1. EAP-PEAP without certificate pinning — vulnerable to evil twin
               with hostapd-mana (MITRE T1557.002)
            2. No 802.11w (PMF) — susceptible to deauthentication attacks
               (MITRE T1498.001)
            3. PMKID hash extractable without client interaction — offline
               cracking possible with hashcat mode 22000
            PCI-DSS 4.0: 2 controls non-compliant (4.2.1, 11.2.1).
            Recommended: migrate to WPA3-Enterprise with SAE, enable PMF,
            deploy WIDS for rogue AP detection."

You: "What attacks are possible against a WPA3-SAE network and how do I test for them?"

You: "Analyze the security of a WPA2-PSK network with WPS enabled"

Agent: -> analyze_wifi_security {encryption: "WPA2-PSK", features: ["WPS"]}
       -> crack_wps {method: "pixie_dust"}
       -> analyze_pmkid {capture_method: "hcxdumptool"}
       -> find_wifi_attacks {target_type: "WPA2-PSK"}
       -> "Critical vulnerabilities found in WPA2-PSK + WPS configuration:
          1. WPS Pixie Dust Attack — PIN recoverable in seconds via
             offline brute-force of E-S1/E-S2 nonces (Reaver + PixieWPS).
             Gives full PSK recovery without client interaction.
          2. PMKID Attack — first packet of 4-way handshake contains
             PMKID hash, crackable offline with hashcat -m 22000.
             No deauth needed, no client needed.
          3. 4-Way Handshake Capture — EAPOL frames capturable with
             airodump-ng + deauth, then offline dictionary attack.
          Priority: Disable WPS immediately (highest risk), enforce
          strong 20+ char PSK, consider migration to WPA3-SAE."

You: "What are the security risks of our BLE-based access control system?"

Agent: -> scan_bluetooth {scan_type: "BLE"}
       -> find_bluetooth_attacks {target_type: "BLE"}
       -> analyze_ble {feature: "GATT", pairing_method: "JustWorks"}
       -> "BLE access control system — 4 critical risks identified:
          1. JustWorks Pairing — no MITM protection. Attacker can
             intercept pairing with Ubertooth One (MITRE T1040).
          2. GATT Characteristic Sniffing — unlock commands sent in
             cleartext, replayable with gatttool (MITRE T1212).
          3. BLE Relay/Replay Attack — relay legitimate unlock signal
             using two devices + btlejack (MITRE T1557).
          4. MAC Address Tracking — static BLE MAC enables occupant
             tracking (MITRE T1592.002).
          Recommended: enforce LE Secure Connections (LESC) with
          Numeric Comparison, encrypt GATT characteristics, implement
          rolling nonces for replay protection."

You: "Assess the wireless security of our smart building IoT deployment"

Agent: -> scan_iot_wireless {protocols: ["Zigbee", "Z-Wave", "MQTT"]}
       -> analyze_zigbee {network_key_type: "default"}
       -> find_mousejack {vendor: "Logitech"}
       -> analyze_wifi_security {encryption: "WPA2-PSK"}
       -> "Smart building IoT wireless assessment — 5 findings:
          1. Zigbee: Default trust center link key (ZigBeeAlliance09)
             allows network join interception with KillerBee (CRITICAL)
          2. MQTT: Broker on port 1883 without TLS — credentials
             and sensor data transmitted in cleartext
          3. Z-Wave: S0 security with known key exchange vulnerability
             — recommend S2 upgrade
          4. MouseJack: 3 Logitech Unifying receivers vulnerable to
             keystroke injection (CVE-2016-10761)
          5. WiFi: IoT devices on same VLAN as corporate — no
             network segmentation
          Priority remediation: MQTT TLS, Zigbee install codes,
          IoT VLAN isolation, replace vulnerable Logitech receivers."

You: "Check our hospital WiFi against HIPAA wireless requirements"

Agent: -> audit_wireless_compliance {standard: "HIPAA", network_type: "WPA2-Enterprise"}
       -> analyze_medical_wireless {device_types: ["infusion_pump", "patient_monitor"]}
       -> detect_wireless_attack {attack_indicators: "rogue_ap"}
       -> "HIPAA Wireless Compliance Audit — 6 findings:
          3 NON-COMPLIANT controls:
          - 164.312(a)(1): No wireless IDS deployed for rogue AP detection
          - 164.312(e)(1): Medical devices using WPA2-PSK (not Enterprise)
          - 164.312(e)(2): No wireless traffic encryption audit logging
          3 COMPLIANT controls:
          - 164.310(a)(1): Physical AP locations documented
          - 164.312(a)(2): 802.1X with RADIUS authentication
          - 164.312(d): Certificate-based EAP-TLS for staff devices
          Remediation plan: deploy WIDS (Kismet/AirMagnet), migrate
          medical devices to WPA2-Enterprise with MAB, enable wireless
          audit logging on WLAN controller."

src/
  index.ts                    # CLI entrypoint (--help, --list, stdio server)
  protocol/
    mcp-server.ts             # MCP server setup (stdio transport)
    tools.ts                  # Tool registry — all 34 composite tools assembled here
  types/
    index.ts                  # Shared types (ToolDef, ToolContext, ToolResult)
  knowledge/                  # 9 built-in knowledge bases
    wifi-attacks.ts           # 47 WiFi attack definitions
    bluetooth-attacks.ts      # 8 Bluetooth attack definitions
    rf-attacks.ts             # 6 RF/SDR attack definitions
    nfc-attacks.ts            # 6 NFC/RFID attack definitions
    cellular-attacks.ts       # 6 Cellular/5G attack definitions
    iot-attacks.ts            # 6 IoT attack definitions
    hardware.ts               # 12 hardware device profiles
    cve-database.ts           # 17 wireless CVEs
    compliance.ts             # 5 compliance frameworks
  wifi/                       # WiFi Core tools (8)
  bluetooth/                  # Bluetooth tools (3)
  rf/                         # RF/SDR tools (1)
  nfc/                        # NFC/RFID tools (1)
  cellular/                   # Cellular/5G tools (1)
  iot/                        # IoT Wireless tools (3)
  advanced/                   # Advanced Wireless tools (6)
  infrastructure/             # Infrastructure tools (4)
  intelligence/               # Intelligence tools (4)
  detection/                  # Detection tools (2)
  reporting/                  # Reporting tools (1)